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ness as a lending institution. 1 Thus, it is hoped that the judiciary
will examine the Kagan court's decision and arrive at a more equitable interpretation of section 673.
John James Lynch

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW

Economic loss due to defective product design held sufficient to
state a cause of action in strict products liability against remote
manufacturer
In the area of products liability, the requirement that the
plaintiff have a direct contractual relationship with the manufacturer against whom it brings an action for damages traditionally
had acted as a formidable barrier to the plaintiff's recovery. This
privity requirement gradually has eroded, however, and is now dependent upon two variables: the type of harm the plaintiff has incurred and the theory upon which the plaintiff's cause of action is
premised.7 3 Thus, in New York, a plaintiff who seeks to redress
71 Based on the holding in Kagan, bank officials, fearing disproportionate felony sanctions, may be reluctant to lend money when there is a mere possibility that the amount lent
may exceed a regulatory limit, even if the transaction would be in the bank's best interest
and there is no risk of loss. See Scott, The Patchwork Quilt: State and Federal Roles in
Bank Regulation, 32 STAN. L. REv. 687, 696 (1980).
72 When there is a direct contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant-manufacturer, the parties are said to be in "privity of contract." See R. EPsTEIN, MODERN PRODucTs LIABiLrrY LAW 9 (1980); Comment, Manufacturers'Liability to Remote Purchasers for "'Economic Loss" Damages-Tort' or Contract, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 539, 545
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Tort or Contract]. This privity requirement once effectively
barred plaintiffs from recovering damages against remote manufacturers. See Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 373, 161 A.2d 69, 77 (1960) (manufacturers were able
to achieve a "large measure of immunity for themselves"); Howard & Watkins, Strict Products Liability in New York and the Merging of Contract and Tort, 42 ALB. L. REv. 603,
603-04 (1978). For illustrations of the types of cases which were barred by the requirement
of privity, see Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 343, 80 N.E. 482, 482 (1907)
(remote manufacturer "ordinarily is not responsible ... to those who may receive injuries
caused by [a product's] defective construction"; negligence action barred); Turner v. Edison
Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 74, 161 N.E. 423, 424 (1928) ("[t]here can be no warranty
[either express or implied] where there is no privity of contract"); Chysky v. Drake Bros.
Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 472, 139 N.E. 576, 578 (1923) ("unless there be privity of contract, there
can be no implied warranty").
" See generally Zammit, Manufacturers' Responsibility for Economic Loss Damages
in Products Liability Cases: What Result in New York?, 20 N.Y.L.F. 81, 82, 87 (1974). The
type of damages incurred by the plaintiff are characterized as economic or physical. Id. at
82. Economic damages include, inter alia, loss of bargain and cost of repairs. Id. Physical

1981]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

personal injuries or property damages, and who brings a breach of
express warranty,7 4 breach of implied warranty,7 5 negligence,7 6 or
strict products liability7 7 cause of action need not be in privity
with the remote manufacturer. When that same non-privity plaindamages are comprised of personal injuries and property damages. Id. The characterization
of loss either as economic or physical, together with the plaintiff's election to state its cause
of action in either negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, or
strict products liability will be determinative of whether the non-privity plaintiff will be
permitted to recover damages. See generally id. at 87.
74 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1980-1981); Spiegel v. Saks 34th
Street, 43 Misc. 2d 1065, 1072, 252 N.Y.S.2d 852, 858 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1964),
afl'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 660, 272 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d Dep't 1966). But see Martin v. Julius
Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 589-90, 374 N.E.2d 97, 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (1978),
discussed in notes 80 and 111 infra. In Spiegel, the non-privity plaintiff was permitted to
recover for injuries sustained through the use of the manufacturer's cosmetic cream on the
theory of breach of the express warranty that the cream was safe. 43 Misc. 2d at 1073, 252
N.Y.S.2d at 859. The express warranty was in the form of a newspaper advertisement. Id. at
1066-67, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54.
75 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1980-1981); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 173 N.E.2d 773, 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1961); accord,
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 84 (1960). But see
Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 589-90, 374 N.E.2d 97, 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d
185, 188 (1978), discussed in notes 80 and 111 infra. Dean Prosser was of the opinion that
Henningsen marked the "fall of the citadel of privity." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 791 (1966). Henningsen involved
an action brought by the wife of the purchaser of a Chrysler automobile for injuries sustained while she was driving the automobile. 32 N.J. at 364, 161 A.2d at 73: The court held
that the implied warranty of merchantability extended to the plaintiff, regardless of the
absence of privity. 32 N.J. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84. Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals,
in Goldberg, extended the implied warranty of the defendant airplane manufacturer to the
non-privity plaintiff. 12 N.Y.2d at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
71 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916),
one of the landmark cases in this area. In MacPherson,Judge Cardozo allowed the plaintiff
to recover under a negligence theory against the remote manufacturer of a defective wheel.
Id. He stated that "[w]e are dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer of the
finished product, who puts it on the market to be used without inspection by his customers.
If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow." Id.
7 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 298 N.E.2d 622, 624, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (1973). Codling held that "today the manufacturer of a defective product
may be held liable to an innocent bystander, without proof of negligence, for damages sustained in consequence of the defect." Id. at 335, 298 N.E.2d at 624, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
The Court reasoned that due to the complex and sophisticated nature of the products being
placed on the market, the manufacturer was in the best position to shoulder the responsibility for any problems which might arise from the use of these products. See id. at 342, 298
N.E.2d at 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 468. For illustrations of the application of this holding, see
Potsdam Welding & Mach. Co. v. Neptune Microfloc, Inc., 57 App. Div. 2d 993, 994, 394
N.Y.S.2d 744, 745-46 (3d Dep't 1977); Infante v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 49 App. Div. 2d
72, 75, 371 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (3d Dep't 1975); Beyer v. Aquarium Supply Co., 94 Misc. 2d
336, 337, 404 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (Sup. Ct. Montgomery County 1977).
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tiff seeks to redress economic losses, however, the cause of action
selected is important. Although a plaintiff may recover economic
losses from a remote manufacturer under a breach of express warranty cause of action 7 8 he may not pursue such a remedy under
negligence7 or breach of implied warranty theories.8 0 Moreover, it
has been unclear whether a plaintiff may recover economic losses
under a strict products liability cause of action."1 Recently, in
78 See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 16, 181
N.E.2d 399, 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367 (1962). The plaintiff in Randy Knitwear sought
damages incurred as a result of the shrinkage of a fabric manufactured by the defendant
and advertised as shrinkproof. Id. at 9, 181 N.E.2d at 400, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 364. The Court,
upon rejecting the defendant's argument that privity of contract was essential to the plaintiff's recovery of economic losses under an express warranty theory, held the manufacturer
liable. Id. at 16, 181 N.E.2d at 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
79 See, e.g., A. Ancelmo Trucking Co. v. Durkee, 11 App. Div. 2d 836, 837, 203 N.Y.S.2d
345, 348 (3d Dep't 1960); Snyder Plumbing & Heating Corp. v. Purcell, 9 App. Div. 2d 505,
508, 195 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (1st Dep't 1960); Steckmar Nat'l Realty & Inv. Corp. v. J.1. Case
Co., 99 Misc. 2d 212, 214, 415 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (economic loss
not the type of harm contemplated by negligence or strict products liability theories).
"0 See Mendelson v. General Motors Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 346, 348, 432 N.Y.S.2d 132,
134 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980) (under implied warranty theory "privity is required
where recovery solely for economic loss is sought."); Steckmar Nat'l Realty & Inv. Corp. v.
J.I. Case Co., 99 Misc. 2d 212, 213, 415 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979)
(recovery of economic losses denied because there was "no contractual relationship between
the parties [and therefore] no warranty either express or implied"). See also Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d at 590, 374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 189 (1978),
wherein the Court of Appeals stated that since strict products liability "displaces the need
for a 'warranty' action by third parties," the non-privity plaintiff could not state a cause of
action in implied warranty against the manufacturer of a defective forklift. Id. at 589-90,
374 N.E.2d at 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 188-89; see note 111 infra.
81 See generally John R. Dudley Constr., Inc. v. Drott Mfg. Co., 66 App. Div. 2d 368,
372-74, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512, 514-16 (4th Dep't 1979); Mendelson v. General Motors Corp., 105
Misc. 2d at 348-49, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 134-35. The plaintiff in Dudley, who had purchased a
defective crane manufactured by the defendant, was permitted to recover under a strict
products liability theory, although the physical damages were limited to the crane itself. 66
App. Div. 2d at 372, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 514. Despite this extension of strict products liability,
the court indicated that it would not be willing to include "benefit of bargain" losses within
the sphere of recoverable damages. Id. at 372, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 514. In Mendelson, although
the plaintiff's complaint did not set forth a cause of action in strict products liability, the
court indicated that even under this theory, the plaintiff's economic losses would not be
recoverable. 105 Misc. 2d at 349, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
The issue has generated considerable controversy among various jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15-18, 403 P.2d 145, 149-50, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22-23
(1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 59-63, 207 A.2d 305, 308-10 (1965).
In Santor, the court held that the plaintiff could sue the manufacturer of defective carpeting on an implied warranty theory. Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 310. The court also indicated that
the facts were sufficient to maintain an action in strict products liability. Id. The measure of
the plaintiff's damages would be the loss in value of the carpeting. Id. at 68-69, 207 A.2d at
313. The court reasoned that the obligation of the manufacturer of a defective product
should be one of an "enterprise liability, and one which should not depend upon the intrica-
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Schiavone Construction Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp.,82 the Appellate
Division, First Department, held that economic losses are recoverable against a remote manufacturer under a strict products liabil83
ity cause of action.
In Schiavone, the plaintiff had purchased a truck hoist from
the defendant Elgood, who in turn contracted with the defendant
Timberland for the manufacture of the hoist.8 4 The hoist delivered
to the plaintiff was inoperable,85 however, and to redress its ensuant economic losses,8 6 the plaintiff brought an action against
both Elgood and the remote manufacturer, Timberland.8 7 Upon
motioning to attach the assets of Timberland,"" however, the plaintiff's causes of action in breach of implied warranty and negligence
were dismissed.89 Nonetheless, special term permitted the plaintiff
to amend its complaint to state a cause of action in strict products
cies of the law of sales." Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312. The Seely court criticized the Santor
decision and its extension of strict products liability. The plaintiff in Seely sustained damages to his truck when it overturned due to certain defects. Although the plaintiff recovered
on a warranty theory, Chief Justice Traynor, in dictum, stated that the plaintiff's economic
losses were not recoverable on a strict products liability theory. 63 Cal. 2d at 17, 403 P.2d at
150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22. For an analysis of the two approaches taken by these courts, see
Note, Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of JudicialConfusion Between Contract and Tort, 54 NoTRE DAME LAW. 118 (1978).
82 81 App. Div. 2d 221, 439 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1st Dep't 1981).
3 Id. at 227, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
84 Id.
at 222, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 934. Timberland manufactured the truck hoist according
to contract specifications provided by Elgood. Id. There was no contractual relationship between Schiavone and Timberland, as evidenced by the absence of the manufacturer's name
on either the equipment or on the plaintiff's bills. Id. The plaintiff required the hoist for
construction work in New York City's East 63rd Street tunnel. Id.
88 Id. According to the plaintiff's complaint, the hoist failed to operate "because, among
other things, the shaft was improper in design and in its fit to the drum, and the cable
equalizer did not and could not fulfill the function for which it was intended." Id.
86Id. at 227-28, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 937 (Silverman, J., dissenting). In addition to recouping the cost of repairs and loss of production, the plaintiff sought to redress its cost of
equipment rentals and additional labor incurred. Id.
8:7
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 1980, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
88 81 App. Div. 2d at 227, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 933; see CPLR 6201(1) (1980). Pending its
suit brought for alleged breach of implied warranty and negligence, the plaintiff sought and
was granted an order of attachment of the defendant's assets, pursuant to CPLR 6201(1).
Prior to the issuance of such an order, a plaintiff must show that there is a cause of action
and that it is probable that he will succeed on the merits. CPLR 6212 (1980); see, e.g.,
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Scrivener, 480 F. Supp. 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Swiss
Bank Corp. v. Eatessami, 26 App. Div. 2d 287, 289, 273 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938 (1st Dep't 1966).
89 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 1980, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980). The court dismissed the plaintiff's breach of implied warranty cause of action because of lack of privity
between the parties. Id. The plaintiff's negligence cause of action was dismissed due to the
non-physical nature of the plaintiff's damages. Id.
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liability, and approved the plaintiff's attachment motion on this
theory. 0
On appeal, a divided appellate division affirmed the lower
court's grant of attachment. 1 Writing for the majority,9 Justice
Fein rejected the traditional view that because economic losses
sound in contract they may only be recouped through a breach of
warranty cause of action, wherein privity of contract is mandated.9 3 Notwithstanding that the court attacked the necessity for
privity in the breach of warranty context on grounds that the requirement presupposed "dubious" economic principles94 and engendered circuitous actions,9 5 it thereafter neglected this line of
reasoning. Indeed, Justice Fein opted instead to circumvent the
"citadel of privity" by holding that economic losses may be recovered under a cause of action having no privity defense-strict
products liability." Conceding that such causes of action generally
have been confined by courts outside of New York to claims
sounding in tort, viz., injuries to the person, Justice Fein stated
that New York case law could be interpreted as sanctioning the use
of a strict products liability cause of action to recover economic
97
losses.

Dissenting, Justice Silverman stressed that New York case law
did not support the use of a strict products liability cause of action
to redress economic losses.9 8 The dissent further argued that the
90 Id.

90 81 App. Div. 2d at 227, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
92 Justices Ross and Markewich joined in Justice Fein's majority opinion. Justice
Silverman filed a dissenting opinion in which Presiding Justice Sullivan concurred.
93 81 App. Div. 2d at 223-24, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 934-35. Justice Fein criticized the view
that a strict products liability cause of action should apply only to physical damages, thus
leaving the commercial aspects of a transaction to be covered by warranty provisions. Id. at
224, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
Id. at 225, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 935. The majority criticized the argument that the ability
of a purchaser and seller to bargain for warranty or disclaimer provisions in their contract is
a sufficient means of apportioning losses. Id.; see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 287-89 (3d Cir. 1980).
95 81 App. Div. 2d at 225, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
Id. at 227, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
Id. at 225, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (citing John R. Dudley Constr., Inc. v. Drott Mfg. Co.,
66 App. Div. 2d 368, 372, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512, 514 (4th Dep't 1979)); see note 81 supra. The
majority stated that "[tihere is no reason why New York need follow either California or the
Federal courts in attempting to bar liability on the theory that strict liability is grounded in
tort and not in warranty." 81 App. Div. 2d at 225, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 935. The majority relied
heavily upon Dudley's extension of strict products liability to include property damage to
the product itself. Id. at 223, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 934. But see note 98 infra.
98 81 App. Div. 2d at 228-29, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 937-38 (Silverman, J., dissenting). In its
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"economic ramifications" of permitting economic losses to be
recouped through a strict products liability cause of action evinced
the necessity for legislative rather than judicial reform in this
area. 9 As further support for renouncing a judicial initiative, the
dissent contended that a manufacturer's duty to distribute safe
products is distinct from its duty to distribute operable products,
and that economic losses incurred by a consumer in the latter situation are not actionable unless a manufacturer fails to meet an
agreed upon performance standard.10 0 The dissent concluded that
since such an agreement sounds in contract, it properly should be
enforced through a breach of warranty and not a strict products
liability cause of action. 101
It is submitted that the Schiavone court improperly fashioned
a tort remedy for what are essentially contract damages.10 2 Nonecriticism of the majority's decision, the dissent quoted extensively from Chief Judge Traynor's opinion in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 17-19, 403 P.2d 145, 149-50, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 21-23 (1965); see note 81 supra, and the opinion in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 287-89 (3d Cir. 1980); see note 94 supra. 81
App. Div. 2d at 230-32, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 938-40 (Silverman, J., dissenting). The dissent disputed the majority's reliance on John R. Dudley Constr., Inc. v. Drott Mfg. Co., 66 App.
Div. 2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (4th Dep't 1979); see note 81 supra. 81 App. Div. 2d at 23234, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 940-41 (Silverman, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the Dudley court clearly had refused to adopt the Santor application of strict products liability to
economic loss, and stated that the Dudley holding was "consistent with the more restrictive
and, we think, the better view of the California court in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965)." 81 App. Div. 2d at 233-34, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 940
(Silverman, J., dissenting) (quoting John R. Dudley Constr., Inc. v. Drott Mfg. Co., 66 App.
Div. 2d at 374, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 516).
9981 App. Div. 2d at 229, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 938 (Silverman, J., dissenting). The dissent
expressed the concern that the economic consequences of the majority's decision would be
"so extensive and unforeseeable that it [would be] better for the courts not to extend strict
products liability to this area, leaving the owner of the product to its remedy based on its
contract with the seller." Id. (Silverman, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 230-31, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (citing Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d at 16, 18, 403 P.2d at 149, 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-23; see note 81
supra).
101 81 App. Div. 2d at 234, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 941 (Silverman, J., dissenting).
102 Although the distinction between physical and non-physical damages seems arbitrary, see, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 ]11.
App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d
1302, 47 Ill.
Dec. 186 (App. Ct. 1980); Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding ProductEconomic
Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REv. 493, 499 (1978), the characterization of recovery for economic loss as a contract remedy appears to be necessary. See generally Speidel, Products
Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REv. 309, 318 (1973); Comment, The
Last Vestige of the Citadel, 2 HOFsTRA L. REv. 721, 730 (1974). Contract law is viewed as
the proper framework in which to seek recovery against a seller of defective merchandise.
Strict products liability was developed to deal with physical damages incurred by the consumer. See Tort or Contract, supra note 72, at 548-49.
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theless, it appears that the court's objective, to prevent the "vestiges of the citadel of privity"10 from barring the plaintiff's claim,
was commendable. Indeed, the Schiavone court recognized the fact
that New York courts generally have been "astute" in finding a
remedy against remote manufacturers'" and that the placement of
responsibility for a defective product at the top of the distribution
chain is a desirable aim.1 0 5 It is suggested, however, that an extension of the breach of implied warranty cause of action to include
foreseeable remote users who are injured, whether physically or
economically, would better implement these policies and not obfuscate the fact that economic losses sound in contract, not in

tort.10 6
Indeed, it is suggested that New York should join those states
which have abolished the privity requirement in breach of implied
1 07
warranty causes of action brought to recoup economic losses. Of
103 81 App. Div. 2d at 227, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
104 Id.; see, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 298 N.E.2d 622, 624, 345

N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 (1973); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 16,
181 N.E.2d 399, 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367 (1962). The erosion of the "citadel of privity" in
New York indicates the desire on the part of New York courts to place responsibility for a
defective product on the manufacturer. See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d at 338-39, 298
N.E.2d at 626, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 466-67. The Codling Court, in adopting strict products liability in New York, stated that "the time has now come when our court, instead of rationalizing broken field running, should lay down a broad principle, eschewing the temptation to
devise more proliferating exceptions." Id. at 339, 298 N.E.2d at 626, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 467
(citation omitted).
10 81 App. Div. 2d at 225, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (quoting Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d at 13, 181 N.E.2d at 403, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 368); see note 78
supra. The majority noted that the Court of Appeals, in Randy Knitwear, desired to force
the manufacturer to "shoulder the resp6nsibility" for placing a defective product on the
market. 81 App. Div. 2d at 225, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 935. Indeed, "[h]aving invited and solicited
the use, the manufacturer should not be permitted to avoid responsibility, when the expected use leads to injury and loss, by claiming that he made no contract directly with the
user." Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d at 13, 181 N.E.2d at 403,
226 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
'06See Note, Torts-ProductsLiability-Strict Liability and Warranty in Products
Liability Action, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 678, 706 (1980). The theories of strict tort liability and
breach of implied warranty are distinct. "Different facts must be proven to establish liability under the two claims and each potentially could permit recovery where the other would
not." Id. But see Tort or Contract, supra note 72, at 549, wherein the author, although
supporting the view that an action for economic loss should be brought under a contract
theory, nevertheless believes that "the results under the two doctrines may not turn out to
be significantly different." Id.
107 See Industrial Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793, 804 (D. Minn. 1980);
Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (court
"convinced that sound policy considerations support the extension of implied warranties to
a remote purchaser and that economic loss should be compensable"); JKT Co. v. Hardwick,
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course, section 2-318 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code
does permit persons not in privity with a manufacturer to recover
damages under a breach of warranty cause of action. 10 8 The statute, however, is restricted to "injuries to the person."1 0 9 Hence, it
is suggested that the legislature should adopt alternative "C" of
section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which extends the
section's coverage to all injuries. 110 Moreover, given the refusal of
the Court of Appeals to abandon outright the doctrine of privity of
contract,' it is urged that the legislature follow the lead of other
274 S.C. 413, 265 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1980) ("South Carolina is in the vanguard in permitting a
plaintiff to recover economic loss [regardless of lack of privity]"); Nobility Homes of Texas,
Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (1977); Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d 82, 82-83 (W.
Va. 1975) (requirement of privity of contract in warranty actions abolished). The court, in
Nobility Homes, reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise, would encourage manufacturers to use
thinly capitalized 'collapsible corporations' to sell their commercially inferior products leaving no one for the buyer to sue for his economic loss." 557 S.W.2d at 81-82 (citations
omitted).
108 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1980-1981). Section 2-318 of the New
York Uniform Commercial Code is entitled "Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied," and provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person if it
is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1980). But see Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip.
Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 589-90, 374 N.E.2d 97, 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (1978), wherein the
Court questioned whether section 2-318 mooted the privity requirement; note 111 infra.
109 See note 108 supra.
110 Compare U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative C (1978 version) with N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1980-1981). In 1975, New York had amended section 2-318 so as to
include as a potential plaintiff in a warranty action any natural person reasonably expected
to use, consume, or be affected by the seller's product "and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty." N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318 (emphasis added). The U.C.C.'s Alternative C,
on the other hand, does not expressly limit the coverage of the action to personal injuries.
Rather, any person "who is injured by breach of the warranty" may maintain an action
against the seller who impliedly or expressly warrants his product. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative C (1978 version) (emphasis added). Alternative C, however, as written, does leave open
the possibility that the seller may exclude or limit such a warranty with respect to nonphysical injuries. Id. Alternative C has been adopted in substance by several states. See,
e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 4-2-318 (1973) (does not leave open the possibility of seller's exclusion or limitation of section for non-personal damages); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-318
(1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-318 (Supp. 1981).
"I See generally Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 589-90, 374 N.E.2d
97, 100, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (1978). The Court of Appeals, in Martin, stated that a plaintiff who is not in privity with the seller of an allegedly defective product may maintain an
action only in negligence or strict products liability against the seller. Id. The Court did not
apply the newly amended U.C.C. section 2-318, which would have covered the plaintiff's
action for implied warranty, because the operative facts of the case occurred prior to the
amendment. Id. at 591, 374 N.E.2d at 101, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 189. The Court left open the
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states which have reworded section 2-318 to expressly abolish the
defense of privity in breach of warranty causes of action.'12 Such
legislation would foster the equitable result strived for by the
Schiavone court without requiring the courts to "astutely" stretch
tort causes of action to redress contract damages.
Rosemary B. Boller

Party to contract may not offer evidence of other party's prior
contradictory agreement with third party
The parol evidence rule prohibits parties to an integrated contract from contradicting the terms of the writing with their prior or
contemporaneous agreements. "1 3 To avoid the harsh results of ineffect of the amendment, while "not[ing] the likelihood of disagreement as to its effect
should a case arise in which its applicability may properly be considered." Id. As predicted
by the Court, there is disagreement as to the amendment's effect in light of Martin, with
some courts disregarding Martin, see, e.g., Atkinson v. Ormont Mach. Co., 102 Misc. 2d 468,
469, 423 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1979); Martin v. Drackett Prods. Co.,
100 Misc. 2d 728, 733, 420 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1979), and others viewing the Court of Appeal's decision as retaining the defense of privity in implied warranty
actions. See, e.g., Held v. 7-Eleven Food Stores, 438 N.Y.S.2d 976, 979 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1981) (dictum).
112 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (Supp. 1981-1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A. 2-318 (Supp. 1979); VA.
CODE § 8.2-318 (1965). Through amendments to section 2-318 of the U.C.C., several states
have expressly abolished the defense of lack of privity in products liability cases. The Massachusetts provision, for example, states that "[l]ack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or
supplier of goods . . .[provided the plaintiff was a foreseeable user or consumer of the
goods]." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 1981); see J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-3, at 404 n.20 (2d ed. 1980).
"3 See Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v. Evans, 306 N.Y. 297, 305, 118 N.E.2d 444, 447 (1954);
Heller v. Pope, 250 N.Y. 132, 135, 164 N.E. 881, 882 (1928); Allen v. Oneida, 210 N.Y. 496,
503, 104 N.E. 920, 922 (1914); Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N.Y. 133, 137 (1891). The parol evidence rule has been well established in New York since the 19th century. See, e.g., Hutchins
v. Hebbard, 34 N.Y. 24, 26 (1865); Barry v. Ransom, 12 N.Y. 462, 464 (1855). Judge Pound
stated that "[p]arol evidence may not be received to vary the clear and unambiguous terms
of a solemn written agreement as between the parties ...." Newburger v. American Sur.
Co., 242 N.Y. 134, 142, 151 N.E. 155, 157 (1926). The rule has been used repeatedly by the
New York courts in determining whether to admit evidence of terms other than those embodied in the language of a written contract. See Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 161, 143
N.E.2d 906, 908, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (1957); Smith v. Dotterweich, 200 N.Y. 299, 305, 93
N.E. 985, 987 (1911); Aratari v. Chrysler Corp., 35 App. Div. 2d 1077, 1077, 316 N.Y.S.2d
680, 681 (4th Dep't 1970).
The parol evidence rule was created to prevent fraud, avoid the danger of memory
lapses, and minimize the effect of the death of key witnesses. Less v. Lamprecht, 196 N.Y.

